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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 2003-2004 UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT TERM
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,* MICHAEL MCCALL**
& MADHAVI MCCALL**"
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the nation marked the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's
historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education.' In writing about the historical
anniversary, Justice Stephen Breyer remarked that, thanks to Brown, "[wie now
accept [the] rule of law as part of our heritage" and "understand that our Constitution was meant to create a democracy that worked not just on paper but in practice. ,2 In the decades since Brown, there has been little doubt that Supreme Court
decisions affecting criminal justice demonstrate this lesson of the "rule of law.. .in
practice,",3 as the rules enunciated by the Court determined such practical and
important issues as when suspects are represented by counsel,4 subjected to
searches, 5 and protected against improper interrogations. 6 Supreme Court decisions
concerning criminal justice have been especially important for the lives of suspects
and the authority of law enforcement officials since "[Chief Justice Earl] Warren's
Court revolutionized constitutional law and American society.. .with a series of
rulings on criminal procedure that extended the rights of the accused"7 in the
1960s.8 Because of their practical importance for applying the rule of law to the
lives-and fates---of human beings, criminal justice issues continue, year after year,
to illustrate the challenges faced by the United States in applying the principles of
constitutional democracy to significant policy problems that arouse public concern.
Criminal justice issues perpetually present judges with difficult problems that
require decisions that carefully define and balance concepts concerning rights,
authority, and power.9 In any given year, one can see both the difficulty and
practical importance of criminal justice issues as legal rulings related to these issues
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Stephen G. Breyer, Editorial, 50 Years After Brown, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004.
3. Id.
4. E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (defendant entitled to representation by counsel at
post-indictment lineup).
5. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to a lawful arrest limited to the
person and nearby locations where weapons or evidence may be hidden).
6. E.g., Brewer v. Wiiams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (limitations on interrogations of represented suspects
outside of the presence of counsel).
7. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERIcAN POLmcS 100 (2d ed. 1990).
8. See CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 68 (1998) ("The liberal justices of the sixties had granted certiorari in criminal cases
mainly to claims brought by defendants for the purpose of overturning convictions and expanding procedural
rights....").
9. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: MYTHS AND REALITIES 4-6 (2004).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

guide j ustice-system officials and define protections for suspects, defendants, and
citizens in general.'°
During the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term, the Court heard more
criminal justice cases than in recent years. The Court decided thirty-three criminal
justice cases" from among seventy-three total cases given complete hearings.12 The
Court decided only twenty-two criminal justice cases in 2002-2003,"3 twenty-seven
criminal justice cases in 2001-2002,4 and twenty-five criminal justice cases in
2000-2001.5 Although the Court decided a higher number of criminal justice cases
in the 2003-2004 Term than in the prior three years, the case numbers are consistent
with earlier terms in the Rehnquist Court era. Indeed, the Court issued thirty-one
criminal justice opinions in the 1999-2000 Term,' 6 thirty in 1996-1997," and
thirty-five in 1997-1998. 8
These changing totals may be a result of unpredictable patterns in the nature of
issues addressed and decided by the state supreme courts and federal appellate
courts.' 9 However, noticeable changes in the Court's attentiveness to specific issues
might provide evidence that certain justices are succeeding in their efforts to shape
the Court's role or agenda. 2' For example, the Court's attention to federalism issues
during the Rehnquist era appears to be the result of the philosophical commitments
of several justices. 21 It is less clear that there is a similar agenda-setting emphasis
on particular criminal justice issues. Overall, despite heightened attention paid by
the Court to criminal justice cases in 2003-2004, there is no indication that
increased or reduced attention to criminal justice can be attributed to anything other
than unpredictable patterns of particular cases brought to the Court each year and

10. See id. at 5 ('The concept of rights in criminal justice, by contrast, actually concerns the legal
protections possessed by individuals against improper actions by government officials....The [government official]
possesses authority, and that authority is limited by the extent of the individual's rights.").
11. The Court also handed down a criminal justice conservative per curiam ruling in Mitchell v. Esparza,
124 S.Ct. 1124 (2004), that we do not cover here.
12. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2004.
13. Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, CriminalJustice and the 2002-03 United States Supreme
Court Term, CAP. U. L.REV. (forthcoming 2005).
14. Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, CriminalJustice and the 2001-02 United States Supreme
Court Term, 2003 MICH.ST. DCLL. REV. 413,413.
15. Christopher E. Smith & Steven B. Dow, CriminalJustice and the 2000-01 U.S. Supreme Court Term,
79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 189 (2002).
16. Christopher E. Smith, CriminalJusticeand the 1999-2000 U.S. Supreme CourtTerm, 77 N.D. L. REV.
1, 1(2001).
17. Christopher E. Smith, CriminalJusticeand the 1996-97 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 30, 33 (1997).
18. Christopher E. Smith, CriminalJustice and the 1997-98 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 S.ILL. U. L.J.
443,443 (1999).
19. The Supreme Court often agrees to hear cases that concern conflicts between lower courts in the
interpretation of the Constitution or federal statutes or lower court decisions that appear to conflict with the
Supreme Court's own precedents. STEPHEN WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT INTHE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 197
(3d ed. 1988).
20. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has long argued that federal courts should reduce their involvement
in various kinds of cases, see Stuart Taylor, Scalia ProposesMajor Overhaul of U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1987, and uses concepts such as standing and justiciability to keep the U.S. Supreme Court from considering
various issues, see RICHARD A. BRJSBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 328
(1997).
21. Warren Richey, States' Rights Momentum on Court May Be Waning, CHRISTIAN S0. MONITOR, May
19, 2004.
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the justices' inclinations to tackle specific issues. As indicated by the foregoing
figures, the Court's selection of criminal justice cases has increased and decreased
in specific years without manifesting any consistent trends.
Court watchers and analysts believe that the Court has been moving to the right
because it has been dominated by conservatives who have "been active in narrowing
or overturning many Warren and Burger Court precedents that were favorable to the
rights" of individuals in the criminal justice system.22 As one author notes of the
Rehnquist Court voting tendencies, "It's definitely a conservative court in the
criminal law area.",23 A majority of contemporary justices have made decisions
"extending broad deference to government in death penalty cases, recognizing
additional exceptions to the Mirandadoctrine and Fourth Amendment exclusionary
the opportunities for police to conduct searches without
rule, and further expanding
24
warrant.,
a valid
The Supreme Court's orientation toward criminal justice is always a matter of
public importance because "Supreme Court decisions.., define constitutional rights
and provide guidelines for the appropriate exercise of authority by criminal justice
officials., 25 Thus, there is good reason to monitor the Court's decision-making
trends in criminal justice. In the early years of the twenty-first century, there may
be even greater reason to monitor the justices' decisions as the legal system faces
an array of percolating issues related to governmental anti-terrorism efforts, such
as the prosecution of suspected terrorists26 and the use of anti-terrorism laws for a
variety of purposes in the criminal justice system.2 7 Indeed, in the term examined
here, the Court issued three important and controversial decisions regarding the war
on terrorism and the treatment of individuals, both citizens and non-citizens,
suspected of plotting against the United States.28 The Court's pronouncements on
these types of issues will define for years to come the scope of executive authority
and the relationship between security and liberty.
This article will explore the Supreme Court's impact on criminal justice during
the 2003-2004 Term through an empirical examination of the Court's decisionmaking processes29 and a review of the cases.3 ° In the final analysis, the Supreme
Court's 2003-2004 criminal justice decisions were consistent with previously
established patterns in the Rehnquist Court's decision making: most cases favored
the interests of the government but a few decisions strengthened protections for
individuals drawn into the criminal justice system.

22. JOHN A. FLrrER,PRISONERS' RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
183 (2001).
23. Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Move Right? It Already Has, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2003 (quoting
John 0. McGinnis, professor at Northwestern Univ. School of Law).
24. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 267 (2000).
25. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,CRIMINAL PROCEDURE xvii (2003).

26. See, e.g., Judge Refuses to Drop Moussaoui Caseand Bars Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003.
27. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses TerrorLaw to Pursue Crimesfrom Drugs to Swindling, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2003.
28. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part IM1.
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II. EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION MAKING
In the tables and discussion that follow, the labels "liberal" and "conservative"
are used as a convenient shorthand to describe the outcomes supported by
individual justices and the Court majority. These labels can be problematic as
consistently applicable classifying categories. 3' However, the use of such categories
is consistent with prior empirical studies of the Supreme Court and enhances
scholars' ability to make systematic comparisons of different Court terms and eras.
The definitions for these labels are drawn from the classifications in the Supreme
Court Judicial Data Base in which "[1]iberal decisions in the area of civil liberties
are pro-person accused or convicted of a crime, pro-civil liberties or civil rights
claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native American] and anti-government in due process
and privacy." 32 By contrast, "conservative" decisions in criminal justice cases favor
the government's interests in prosecuting and punishing offenders over recognition
or expansion of rights for individuals.33
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the Supreme Court's 2003-2004 criminal
justice decisions according to the Court's vote totals and the direction of the Court's
decisions. Unlike past years in which the decisions predominately favored the
government,3 4 last Term yielded a relatively even number of liberal and conservative decisions (fifteen liberal and eighteen conservative). The table shows a mix of
consensus and division in the Court's criminal justice decisions. Nearly one-third
of the Court's decisions (ten) were unanimous, while more than half of the
decisions (sixteen) showed significant disagreement among the justices, as there
were at least three dissenters. The percentage of unanimous decisions in 2003-2004
is similar to the rate of seven unanimous decisions in twenty-two cases during
2002-2003, 3" and a bit higher than the percentage in 2001-2002, where seven of
twenty-seven cases yielded unanimous decisions. While the number of unanimous
decisions has been relatively constant for the last three terms, there appears to be

31. Although the term "liberal" is used to describe outcomes in which the Court favors individuals' rights
over the interests of government, there are some situations in which justices with so-called conservative values are
more likely to favor individuals. For example, cases concerning property rights often produce role reversals among
the justices considered "liberal" and those considered "conservative," with the usual liberals supporting the
government's authority to regulate property and the usual conservatives supporting individuals' property rights.
Such a role reversal occurred, for example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Despite the problems in applying these terms to all kinds of issues, the liberal label is typically reserved for those
justices who support the claims of individuals, and such support can often appear to reflect particular justices'
values because of consistencies in their patterns of decision making. For example, Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall earned their "liberal" labels by supporting individuals' claims in civil rights and liberties cases
nearly ninety percent of the time during their service in the Rehnquist Court era. See THOMAS R. HENSLEY,
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES 57, 61 (1997).
32. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, DecisionalTrendson the Warren andBurgerCourts:Resultsfrom
the Supreme Court DataBase Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 (1989).
33. HENSLEY, SMITH & BAUGH, supra note 31, at 868 ("[A] liberal decision is one which favors the
individual claiming a civil rights or liberties violation by the government; conversely, those decisions favoring the
government are considered to be conservative.").
34. For instance, in the 2002-2003 term, the Court rendered liberal outcomes in only thirty-six percent of
the cases. Smith & McCall, supra note 13.
35. Id.
36. Smith & McCall, supra note 14, at 426-27.
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less agreement among thesejustices overtime. Indeed, the percentage of unanimous
cases was nearly forty percent in 2000-2001," 1999-2000, 38 and 1998-1999, 39
while nearly fifty percent of decisions were unanimous in the 1995-199640 and
1996-1997 terms.4 1 This consistent, albeit modest, increase in disagreement
concerning criminal justice cases may reflect a trend toward greater division and
conflict among the justices.

TABLE 1: CASE DISTRIBUTION BY VOTE AND

LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE OUTCOME IN U.S. SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS, 2003-2004 TERM
Total
Conservative
Liberal
Vote
10
6
4
9-0
3
1
2
8-1
4
3
1
7-2
5
2
3
6-3
11
6
5
5-4
33
18 (54.5%)
15 (45.5%)
Total
Another striking aspect of the 2003-2004 Term is the high number of five-to-four
criminal justice cases (eleven) handed down by the Court.a2 As one Court observer
notes, the 2000-2001 Term was "the first time in modern memory" that the Court
handed down more five-to-four decisions than unanimous decisions.4 3 In criminal
justice cases, the Court handed down more five-to-four cases than unanimous
decisions in the 2000-2001 Term," the 2001-2002 Term, 45 and now the 2003-2004
Term. This again points to the possibility that divisions have widened on this Court.
Moreover, one of the most interesting aspects of the cases that deeply divided the
Court was the representation of liberal outcomes. Half (eight of sixteen) of the fiveto-four and six-to-three decisions produced liberal outcomes,46 which means that
one or more of the Court's more conservative members, typically Justice O'Connor
or Kennedy, abandoned their usual colleagues to join the moderate liberals. This
result may appear surprising if one focuses only on five-to-four decisions in a
specific term, such as the 2000-2001 Term, in which conservatives controlled the

37. Smith & Dow, supra note 15, at 192.
38. Smith, supranote 16, at 4.
39. Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1998-99 United States Supreme Court Term, 9
WDENER J. PUB. L. 23, 27 (1999).
40. Christopher E. Smith, CriminalJustice andthe 1995-96 U.S. Supreme CourtTerm, 74 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 1,4 tbl.I (1996).

41. Smith, supra note 17, at 33.
42. See infra note 366.
43. Associated Press, Election Decision Defined Court'sTerm, HOLLAND SENTINEL (July 1, 2001), availableathttp://www.hollandsentinel.com/stories/070101/new_0701010027.shtm (on file with the New Mexico Law
Review).
44. Smith & Dow, supra note 15, at 193 tbl.l.
45. Smith & McCall, supra note 14, at 417 tbl.l.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 284-286, 366-368.
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outcomes in six of the seven deeply-divided decisions.4 7 In reality, however, if one
examines the five-to-four and six-to-three decisions in the prior terms, liberal
outcomes are consistently evident in split decisions, ranging from lows of three out
of eleven in 1996-199748 and four out of fourteen in 1999-2000,49 to highs of seven
out of fifteen in 2001-20020 and four out of nine in 1998-1999."' Still, this past
term is the first one in recent memory where the conservative and liberal split in
these highly contentious cases was nearly even.
A theory advanced by some observers posits that the diminution of conservative
dominance in these issues reflects the increasing influence of Justice John Paul
Stevens.52 In the words of one analyst, "Justice Stevens emerged as a unifying and
leading force on the court in part because in an array of important cases the
conservative majority did not hold and that left him in control."5 3 Justice Stevens
can use his power as senior justice to assign authorship of the majority opinion
when Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents.54 He can use this power to cultivate Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy by assigning important opinions to them. He can also
assign opinions to himself and craft persuasive reasoning that will appeal to Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy as a means to defeat conservative
outcomes preferred by
56
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia.
Like the preceding term, in which fifty-nine percent of the Court's criminal
justice decisions concerned constitutional issues,57 the 2003-2004 Term yielded a
high number of cases concerning constitutional issues (seventy-six percent), as was
also true during the Court's 1998-1999,58 1999-20 0 0 , "9 and 2001-2002 terms. 60 The
percentage of constitutional cases last Term, however, was much higher than the
percentages in the prior term and may reflect the generation of new constitutional
issues stemming from the war on terrorism that the Court dealt with last Term. By
contrast, in the 2000-2001 Term, only forty-four percent of the criminal justice
cases involved constitutional issues. 61 Nonconstitutional issues also comprised the
majority of criminal justice decisions in the 1995-1996,62 1996-1997,63 and
1997-1998 terns.6 The inconsistent pattern of constitutional and nonconstitutional
issues decided by the Court each term reinforces the perception that, as with the
number of criminal justice cases chosen for decision, the selection of specific issues

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Smith & Dow, supra note 15, at 193.
Smith, supra note 17, at 33 tbl.1.
Smith, supra note 16, at 4 tbl.1.
Smith & McCall, supra note 14, at 417 tbl.l.
Smith, supra note 39, at 28 tbl.1.
See, e.g., Warren Richey, The Quiet Ascent ofJusticeStevens, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, July 9, 2004.
Id. (quoting Thomas Goldstein).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith & McCall, supra note 13.
Smith, supra note 39, at 29 tbl.2.
Smith, supra note 16, at 6 tbl.2.
Smith & McCall, supra note 14, at 419 tbl.2.
Smith & Dow, supra note 15, at 195 tbl.2.
Smith, supra note 40, at 5-6 tbl.2.
Smith, supra note 17, at 34 tbl.2.
Smith, supra note 18, at 446-47 tbl.2.
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is determined by the ebb and flow of issues presented to thejustices rather than any
planned or strategic agenda.65
TABLE 2: ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT'S
2003-2004 TERM
Constitutional Issues - 26 (79%)
War on Terrorism, Access to68 Judicial Proceedings: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld;6 Rasul v.
Bush;67 Rumsfeld v. Padilla

Search and Seizure: Groh v. Ramirez;69 Illinois v. Lidster;7 ° Thornton v. United
73 United States v. FloresStates;71 United States v. Banks;72 Maryland v. Pringle;
74 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial DistrictCourt 75
Montano;
76
Access to Courts: Tennessee v. Lane
77
Right to Counsel: Iowa v. Tovar
78
Double Jeopardy: United States v. Lara
v. Campbell8
Eighth Amendment: Beard v. Banks;7982Tennard v. Dretke;8 Nelson
83
Summerlin
v.
Trial by Jury: Blakely v. Washington; Schriro
84
Right to Confront Witnesses: Crawford
85 v. Washington
ACLU
v.
First Amendment: Ashcroft
86 Yarborough v. Alvarado;87 Missouri
Self-Incrimination: United States v. Patane;
88 Fellers v. United States89
v. Seibert;
9°
Civil Rights: Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders
91
States
United
v.
Sabri
Powers of Congress:

65. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
66. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
67. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
68. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
69. 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
70. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
71. 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
72. 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
73. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
74. 124 S.Ct. 1582 (2004).
75. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004). This case also concerns the Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination and the right to privacy.
76. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
77. 124 S. Ct. 1379 (2004).
78. 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).
79. 124 S.Ct. 2504 (2004).
80. 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).
81. 124 S. Ct. 2117 (2004).
82. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
83. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
84. 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
85. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
86. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
87. 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
88. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
89. 124 S. Ct. 1019 (2004).
90. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
91. 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004).
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Other Issues - 7 (21%)

Habeas Corpus: Plilerv. Ford;92 Baldwin v. Reese93
94 Banks v. Dretke;95 Castro v. United
Federal Criminal Procedure: Dretke v. Haley;97
96 United States v. Dominguez Benitez
States;
98
International Tort: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In theory, the Court's attention is drawn to controversial, unsettled, or emerging
areas of law when it grants writs of certiorari. 99 Thus, it is not surprising that the
Court addressed controversies like the treatment of terrorism suspects,'O° the
regulation of sexually explicit material on the internet,' ° ' sexual harassment,10
illegal searches,0 3 and Miranda rights.' °4 These issues have garnered significant
attention from critics and commentators in recent years.' °5 Unlike in 2002-2003,1°6
the Court addressed search and seizure issues during the 2003-2004 Term. Indeed,
from the 1995-1996 Term through the 1999-2000 Term, Fourth Amendment issues
comprised the largest category of constitutional criminal justice issues addressed
by the Court and more than twelve percent of the total criminal justice cases. 0 7 The
high number of search and seizure issues addressed last Term suggests that the prior
term's lack of cases may merely reflect the vagaries of the mixture of issues
submitted to the Court during that specific term.
Table 3 shows the liberal/conservative voting patterns of individual justices in
criminal justice cases for the 2003-2004 Term. Justice Thomas was thejustice least

92. 124 S. Ct. 2441 (2004).
93. 124 S. Ct. 1347 (2004).
94. 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
95. 124 S. Ct. 1256 (2004).
96. 124 S. Ct. 786 (2003).
97. 124 S. Ct. 2333 (2004).
98. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
99. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 112 (6th ed. 1998).
The Court's Rule 10 does provide general guidance by specifying some of theconditions under
which the Court will hear a case. The rule emphasizes the Court's role in ensuring the certainty
and consistency of the law. The criteria for accepting a case cited in Rule 10 include the
existence of important legal issues that the Court has not yet decided, conflict among courts of
appeals on a legal question, conflict between a lower court's decision and the Supreme Court's
prior decisions, and departure 'from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings' in
the courts below.
Id.
100. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
101. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
102. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
103. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004); United States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S.
Ct. 1582 (2004); Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004); Ilinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2003); Maryland v.
Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003); United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004);
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004); Fellers v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1019 (2004).
105. See TED GUEST, CRIME & POLIrICs: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER
189-218 (2001).
106. Smith & McCall, supra note 13.
107. Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and CriminalJustice: An EmpiricalAssessment, 19 J.
CONTEMP. C~iM. JUST. 161, 167 (2003).
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likely to support individuals' claims in criminal justice cases during the most recent
term (fifteen percent), with Chief Justice Rehnquist (eighteen percent) and Justice
Scalia (twenty-one percent) close behind. Justices Stevens and Souter stood out as
the most consistent supporters of individual rights in criminaljustice cases (seventytwo percent each), followed by Justice Ginsburg (sixty-six percent). Justice Souter' s
support for individual rights last Term was higher than in past terms. For instance,
he supported liberal outcomes in criminal justice cases in only fifty-nine percent of
cases in the 2002-2003 Term, ' 8 sixty-three percent in the 2001-2002 Term,"° and
sixty percent in the 2000-2001 Term.l"° Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were nearly
as liberal in the term's criminal justice cases. Justice Ginsburg had been regarded
as an outspoken defender of constitutional rights during her pre-judicial career as
a lawyer,"' but on the U.S. Supreme Court, her early voting record earned her the
"characterization... as a judicial moderate."1 2 Justice Ginsburg's level of support
for individuals' claims in criminal justice cases during two earlier terms-45.5
percent (1995-1996)' 3 and fifty-three percent (1996-1997)l 4 -cast her as a moderate near the middle of the Court. Justice Ginsburg's increased support for indivi5
duals during the 1997-1998 (sixty percent)," 1998-1999 (sixty-eight percent)," 16
1 7
1999-1900 (67.7 percent), 2000-2001 (sixty-four percent),' 8 2001-2002 (sixtythree percent)," 19 and 2003-2004 terms (sixty-seven percent) may be attributable
either to changes in her attitudes and voting strategies 21 or to a change in the mix
of criminal justice cases presented to the Supreme Court. 121 Finally, Justice Breyer
reemerged as the Court's "center" on criminal justice cases, 22 Supporting the rights
of individuals in fifty-seven percent of cases.

108. Smith & McCall, supranote 13.
109. Smith & McCall, supranote 14, at 423.
110. Smith & Dow, supra note 15, at 197.

111. See Joyce A. Baugh, Christopher E. Smith, Thomas R. Hensley & Scott Patrick Johnson, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg:A PreliminaryAssessment, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994).
112. HENSLEY, SMITH & BAUGH, supranote 31, at 81.
113. Smith, supra note 40, at 6.
114. Smith, supra note 17, at 37.
115. Smith, supranote 18, at 450.

116. Smith, supranote 39, at 32.
117. Smith, supra note 16, at 9.
118. Smith & Dow, supra note 15, at 197.
119. Smith & McCall, supranote 14, at 423.
120. Justices' decisions about how to vote in Supreme Court cases are largely attributable to their values and
attitudes and to the strategic choices they make to persuade colleagues or advance particular doctrines. See
generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
121. See Thomas R. Hensley & Christopher E. Smith, Membership Changeand Voting Change:An Analysis
of the Rehnquist Court's 1986-1991 Terms, 48 POL. RES. Q. 837 (1995).
122. See discussion of Justice Breyer's voting record in Smith & McCall, supra note 14, at 422.
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TABLE 3: INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES' LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE VOTING
PERCENTAGES IN U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DECISIONS, 2003-2004 TERM
(Percentages Are Rounded)

Justice

Liberal

Conservative

Thomas

15% (5)

85% (28)

Rehnquist
Scalia
O'Connor
Kennedy
Breyer
Ginsburg
Souter
Stevens

18% (6)
21% (7)
33% (11)
36% (12)
58%(19)
67% (22)
73% (24)
73% (24)

82% (27)
79% (26)
67% (22)
64% (21)
42%(14)
33% (11)
27% (9)
27% (9)

Consistent with the trend in the last four terms, 2 3 there was differentiation
between the Court's two ideological wings. The highest support for individual
rights among the Court's five most conservative justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy) came from Justice Kennedy
at thirty-six percent. Thus, the difference in support for individual rights between
the Court's most liberal conservative (Justice Kennedy) and the Court's most
conservative liberal (Justice Breyer) was a pronounced twenty-one percent. In
2001-2002, the division was also notable, with a twenty-four percentage-point
difference between the most moderate conservative, Justice O'Connor (thirty
percent), and the most moderate liberals, Justices Breyer and Souter (fifty-four
percent). 24 In the most recent term, there was comparable differentiation between
the four most conservative justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas,
Scalia, and O'Connor) and the four most liberal justices (Justices Souter, Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Stevens).
The philosophical differences between the justices become accentuated when the
analytical focus is limited to non-unanimous decisions. 25 As indicated in Table 4,
Justice O'Connor may have served a role similar to Justice Kennedy's by providing
a vote for individuals' claims in a notable (albeit minority) portion of the Court's
non-unanimous decisions.

123. See Smith & McCall, supra note 13; Smith & McCall, supra note 14; Smith & Dow, supra note 15;
Smith, supra note 16.
124. Smith & McCall, supra note 14, at 423.
125. On an en banc court, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, individual judicial officers may feel freest to
express their disagreements with the majority. When the decision makers split, their disagreements should
genuinely reflect the nature and strength of their differences. By contrast, on a three-member appellate panel, a
potential dissenter may be deterred by the thought that he or she must dissent alone and carry the entire burden of
presenting a dissenting opinion. Christopher E. Smith, Polarizationand Change in the FederalCourts: En Banc
Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133, 134 (1990).
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TABLE 4: INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES' LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE VOTING
PERCENTAGES IN NON-UNANIMOUS U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL
JUSTICE DECISIONS, 2003-2004 TERM
(Percentages Are Rounded)
Conservative
Liberal
Justice
91% (21)
9% (2)
Thomas
87% (20)
13% (3)
Rehnquist
83% (19)
17% (4)
Scalia
65% (15)
35%
(8)
O'Connor
61%(14)
39%(9)
Kennedy
30% (7)
70% (16)
Breyer
17%(4)
83% (19)
Ginsburg
9% (2)
91% (21)
Souter
9% (2)
91% (21)
Stevens
Table 5 shows an analysis of inter-agreement between individual justices on the
Supreme Court. Such inter-agreement tables are used to detect the existence of
TABLE 5: INTER-AGREEMENT PERCENTAGES FOR PAIRED JUSTICES
IN U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS,
2003-2004 TERM
(Percentages Are Rounded)
Gn
St
Br
So
Ke
Sc
O'C
Re
Th
52
46
61
46
85
82
85
91
Re
49
42
46
42
70
72
88
Th
49
42
52
49
73
76
Sc
61
61
67
85
76
O'C
64
64
67
64
Ke
79
79
91
Br
94
88
So
88
Gn
St
Court Mean: 69
Sprague Criterion: 83.6
Voting Blocs:
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer: 86
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas: 88
Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor: 84
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy: 84
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voting blocs on the high court.'26 The one strong four-member voting bloc was comprised of the Court's four liberals (Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg).
The blocs made up of conservative justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) also voted together with
sufficient regularity to meet the voting bloc criteria, but they did not form the strong
four-member voting bloc (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and
Kennedy) that they represented in the prior term.' 27 Apparently the mix of issues in
the most recent term did not draw all of the Court's most conservative justices
together to the same extent as in the recent past. Interestingly, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was a member of all three conservative voting blocs.
A focus on non-unanimous decisions generates more pronounced differences
between the justices, yet the voting blocs remain the same (see Table 6). The
TABLE 6: INTER-AGREEMENT PERCENTAGES FOR PAIRED JUSTICES
IN US. SUPREME COURT NON-UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS,
2003-2004 TERM

(Percentages Are Rounded)
Re

Re
Th
Sc
O'C
Ke
Br
So
Gn
St

Th

Sc

O'C

Ke

Br

So

Gn

St

78

87

78

74

44

22

30

22

83

57
65

61
61
78

22
30
65
52

17
26
44
48
70

26
26
52
48
87
83

17
17
44
48
70
91
83

Court Mean: 53
Sprague Criterion: 76
Voting Blocs:
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer: 81

Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas: 83
Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor: 77
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy: 77
justices most likely to disagree with each other were at the endpoints of the liberal
and conservative voting spectrums. Justices Stevens and Souter, exhibiting the most
liberal voting records, disagreed most frequently with Justice Thomas, the most

126. In empirical studies of the Supreme Court, voting blocs are determined according to the "Sprague
Criterion." The Sprague Criterion is calculated by subtracting the average agreement score for the entire Court from
100. The resulting number is divided by two and added to the Court average in order to establish the threshold level
for defining a bloc. A bloc exists when the individual agreement scores for a set of justices exceed the threshold
established by the Sprague Criterion calculation. JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 51-61 (1968).
127. Smith & McCall, supra note 13.
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conservative justice. In addition, Justice Stevens, who tied with Justice Souter last
Term as the most liberal voter and has generally been considered the most liberal
voter on this Court over the past several years, agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the second most conservative justice, in a surprisingly high percentage of nonunanimous decisions (twenty-two percent). These apparent anomalies reinforce the
impression that the justices react to the specific mix of issues presented to them in
a given term rather than reflexively voting in agreement with perceived philosophical allies or in disagreement with perceived ideological opponents.
III. CASE DECISIONS
A. Unanimous Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court handed down ten unanimous criminal justice decisions
during the 2003-2004 Term. 28 Of these, the justices rendered liberal decisions in
four cases 129 and conservative decisions in six cases. 130 Starting with the liberal
outcomes, in Nelson v. Campbell, 3' the Court ruled that a condemned offender may
file a civil rights action challenging the "cut-down" procedures used to identify and
prepare a vein for lethal injection executions. 3 2 Nelson was an intravenous drug
user whose veins were severely compromised due to drug usage. 3 3 In order to
execute him using lethal injection, the warden mandated a vein preparation
method-the cut-down procedure-that involved making a two-inch incision in
Nelson's arm or leg, a procedure that was performed one hour before the execution,
using local anesthesia."3 Nelson challenged the procedure as a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 35 The claim rested in part
on an affidavit from a board certified anesthesiologist and assistant professor at
Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons asserting that the cutdown procedure was dangerous and antiquated.' 36
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, a unanimous Court remanded the case
back to the lower courts for an evidentiary hearing to determine if, in fact, the cutdown procedure violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.'37 In so doing, the Court left open the possibility that certain methods of
execution, or at least preparations for executions, might be Eighth Amendment
violations, independent of a challenge to imprisonment.

128. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct.
2333 (2004); Iowa v. Tovar, 124 S. Ct. 1379 (2004); United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003); Maryland v.
Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003); United States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004); Castro v. United States,
124 S. Ct. 786 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); Fellers v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1019
(2004); Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S. Ct. 2117 (2004).
129. See Castro, 124 S. Ct. 786; Crawford, 124 S. Ct. 1354; Fellers, 124 S. Ct. 1019; Nelson, 124 S. Ct.
2117.
130. See Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1941; DominguezBenitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333; Tovar, 124 S. Ct. 1379; Banks, 124
S. Ct. 521; Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795; Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582.
131. 124 S.Ct. 2117 (2004).
132. Id. at 2122.
133. Id. at 2121.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2120.
136. Id. at 2121-22.
137. Id. at 2124-26.
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In a second liberal ruling, the Court held, in Fellers v. United States, 38 that
police violated a petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by extracting
inculpatory statements from him at thejailhouse following Mirandawarnings, when
the police had previously extracted the same statements from the petitioner at his
home without providing the Mirandawarnings.' 39 Fellers was arrested for involvement in drug distribution."4 During his arrest, Fellers made several incriminating
statements to police, before officers had advised him of his Mirandarights.' 4 ' Upon
arriving at the jail, Fellers waived his Miranda rights and reiterated his earlier
statements. 14 2 While the court of appeals suppressed Fellers' statements made at his
home during the arrest, it allowed the statements made at the jail, concluding that
the right to counsel had not been violated because Fellers had knowingly waived
such rights. 143 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the high Court held that Fellers'
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because the police had deliberately
elicited information from him outside the presence of counsel and after he had been
indicted. 144
In another Sixth Amendment, liberal, unanimous decision, this time involving the
Confrontation Clause, the Court ruled that prosecutors' use of a witness's recorded
statement does not afford defendants the opportunity to confront witnesses as
constitutionally guaranteed. 145 In Crawfordv. Washington,'"Michael Crawford was
charged with attempted murder and assault for stabbing a man, Kenneth Lee, who
allegedly tried to rape his wife. 147 Crawford and his wife, Sylvia, went to Lee's
apartment to confront him about the attempted rape.148 Crawford and Lee fought and
Lee was stabbed.149 Crawford and his wife were questioned separately by police and
both gave essentially the same account of events leading up to the fight, but their
accounts differed considerably when asked if Lee had drawn a weapon before he
while Sylvia's account
was stabbed. 5 ' Crawford asserted that Lee was armed
52
differed.' 5 ' At trial, Crawford claimed self-defense.
Because the state could not force Sylvia to testify against her husband without
violating marital privilege, the prosecutors instead introduced her recorded
statements made to the police.' 5 3 Crawford was convicted and challenged the
introduction of his wife's statements as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. 5 4 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia agreed with

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

124 S. Ct. 1019 (2004).
Id. at 1021.
Id.
Id.
Id.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 1023.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1357-58.
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1356-57.
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Crawford.' 5 5 Relying on historical arguments, the Court noted that the purpose of
156
the Clause was to prevent the use of ex parte examinations and hearsay testimony.
Moreover, the Court noted that, for the most part, the principles of the
Confrontation Clause have been strictly upheld.15 7 Although recent Court decisions
allowed recorded statements to be used if the statements could be deemed reliable,
the Court found trial courts' determinations of reliability to be unworkable and
was the only
inconsistent. 58 Thus, the Court determined that cross-examination
1 59
acceptable way to test the truthfulness of a witness's statements.
In a final unanimous, liberal ruling, Castro v. United States,' 6° the justices ruled
that a court may not recharacterize a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief
unless the prisoner is informed of the change and warned of the limits
recharacterizations may place on subsequent petitions.'6 1 The petitioner also must
be allowed to change or withdraw the petition in light of the court's intentions.' 62
The remaining six unanimous decisions ended in conservative outcomes. Of
these, three cases involved Fourth Amendment claims.' 63 In UnitedStates v. FloresMontano,1" the Court clarified rules governing the search of vehicles at border
stops, stating that not even reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct routine
searches, and that removal and search of a gas tank falls under the routine search
category.' 65 In this case, customs officials in Southern California conducted an
initial inspection of Flores-Montano's car as he attempted to enter the United
States. 66 Without any reason for suspicion, the officials ordered a secondary
inspection of the car. 167 Upon noting at this second inspection that the tank seemed
solid, officials ordered the tank dismantled and found thirty-seven kilograms of
marijuana inside. 68 After being indicted for importing marijuana, Flores-Montano
sought to have the marijuana suppressed, arguing that the Fourth Amendment
requires at least reasonable suspicion to remove the gas tank. 169 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed, stating that removal of a gas tank was not a routine search
for which no suspicion was required. 7 0 Without reasonable suspicion, the Ninth
Circuit held, the search was invalid. 7 '

155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1360.
See id. at 1367-69.

158. Id. at 1369-71.
159. Id. at 1369.
160. Castro v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 786 (2003).
161.

Id. at 789.

162. Id.
163. United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003); Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003); United
States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004).
164. 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004).

165. Id. at 1584-86.
166.

Id. at 1584.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1584, 1586.
170. Id. at 1584.
171. Id.
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Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed the Ninth
Circuit's ruling, finding the search to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 172
The Court noted that most searches at the border are reasonable simply because they
occur at the border.' The Court further noted that privacy interests are reduced at
the border and that dismantling and reassembling a gas tank is not a significant
deprivation of property.'74 Finally, the Court remarked that on the Southern
California border alone in 2003, over 300 gas tanks were dismantled and reassembled, and car owners were allowed to enter the United States when narcotics were not
found.'7 5 The Court thus reiterated its stand that suspicionless, routine searches at
the border are constitutional.
176
The Court also dealt with a Fourth Amendment issue in Maryland v. Pringle,
in which it held that a police officer had probable cause to arrest all individuals in
a car after finding drugs and money in the car, even though the officer had no
individualized suspicion regarding which one of the car's occupants owned the
money and drugs. 177 Joseph Pringle was the backseat passenger in a car that was
pulled over for speeding at 3 A.M.1 78 When the driver opened the glove compartment
to get the car's registration, the officer noticed a wad of money and ordered a full
search of the car during which the police found cocaine. 17' The police informed the
car's occupants that all of them would be arrested if no one admitted owning the
drugs. 8 ° No one confessed to owning the drugs and all were arrested. 18' At the
police station and upon waiving his Mirandarights, Pringle admitted to owning the
drugs but later contended that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him,
making the arrest invalid.'82
Chief Justice Rehnquist and a unanimous Court found the actions of the law
enforcement officers to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 8 3 The opinion
noted that the police had probable cause to stop the car and then had probable cause
to believe a felony had been or was being committed." Because of the quantities
of money and drugs recovered, the Court concluded that it was reasonable to believe
8
that any or all of the car occupants owned, knew of, and/or controlled the drugs. 1
Consequently, the police had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed
a crime, 6making the arrest constitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend8

ments.1

172. Id. at 1585.
173. Id. at 1586.
174. Id. at 1586-87.
175. Id. at 1587-88.

176. 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

802.
798.

798-99.
799.
802.
800-01.

185. Id. at 801.
186. Id. at 802.
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In UnitedStates v. Banks,"7 a final Fourth Amendment, conservative, unanimous
decision, the Court held that police officers acted constitutionally when they waited
only fifteen to twenty seconds after knocking before breaking down the respondent's door to execute a search warrant. 88 Banks was suspected of selling cocaine
from his home.189 Local and federal officers obtained a search warrant for Banks'
apartment and went to execute the warrant.'" Officers knocked loudly on the front
door, briefly waited, and then broke down the door.' 9 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals suppressed the evidence.' 92 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, noting, in an opinion by Justice Souter, that the Fourth Amendment does
not specify what formalities officers must use when executing a warrant.' 93 The
Court concluded that it is reasonable for the police to believe that a suspect,
particularly one suspected of drug-related offenses, might not have answered the
door in order to dispose of the drugs, and, thus, waiting a short time between knocking and breaking down the door is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.'9 4
The Court also handed down a unanimous conservative decision in Iowa v.
Tovar,'95 which focused on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' 96 Tovar was
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.'97 Tovar told the trial court he
wanted to represent himself and, after being informed of the dangers of representing
himself, pleaded guilty. 98 Two years later, Tovar pleaded guilty again for his
second offense and, in 2000, was arrested a third time. 9' For his third offense,
Tovar pleaded not guilty and, represented by counsel, argued that his first conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel at that point and was
not made adequately aware of the dangers of self-representation. 2 °° The U.S.
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, found that, since the
original trial courts had warned Tovar about such dangers and because he had
waived his right to legal representation, the Sixth Amendment had not been violated. 2 ' 1
The Court handed down two final unanimous, conservative decisions, both
dealing with statutory interpretation. 21 In Sabri v. United States, 203 the Court ruled
that a bribery statute need not require proof of a connection between federal funds

187.

124 S. Ct. 521 (2003).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 2002).
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 524-25.
Id. at 526-27.
124 S. Ct. 1379 (2004).
Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id. at 1384-85.
Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1386.
Id. at 1390.
Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333

(2004).
203.

124 S. Ct. at 1945-47.
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and the alleged bribe."° Rather, it is sufficient that the statute specify a threshold
amount for the bribe, and that the bribe go beyond the offer of tobacco and liquor.0 5
In a second case, United States v. Dominguez Benitez,2° the Court held that, even
though a defendant was not informed during his plea colloquy, he could not change
his plea if the court did not accept the State's plea recommendations, and he was not
permitted to withdraw his plea after the court rejected the plea recommendations.2 07
The Supreme Court reasoned that, while the lower court had erred by not informing
the defendant at this juncture, he had been informed of this fact earlier in the plea
bargaining process.2 08 Under these circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded
guilty had the lower court not erred."° In Dominguez Benitez, such reasonable
probability did not exist.210
B. Eight-to-One Decisions
The Court issued three eight-to-one criminal justice decisions during the
2003-2004 Term. 21 ' Of these, one case-Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2 12-was one of three
rulings during the term addressing the rights of detainees captured during the "war
on terrorism" to gain access to the courts. 213 The Court also handed down eight-toone decisions
in a sexual harassment case 214 and a case concerning habeas corpus
215
relief.
The most controversial of the three eight-to-one cases, Hamdi, was one of three
cases dealing with the entitlement of detainees suspected of plotting terrorist
activities to gain access to the U.S. courts for the purpose of challenging their detentions. 216 In an eight-to-one, liberal ruling, in which, surprisingly, Justices Scalia and
Stevens joined together to articulate the Court's most liberal position, the Court
held that the two-year detention of U.S. citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi was invalid.2 17
Nearly all of the Justices agreed with the general direction of the Court's opinion,
with only Justice Thomas arguing that the federal government's war powers allow
the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens without any opportunity for court proceed-

204. Id.
205. Id. at 1946.
206. 124 S. Ct. 2333 (2004).

207. Id. at 2338.
208. See id. at 2341.

209. Id. at 2336.
210. Id. at 2341.
211. See Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
212. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
213. The other two cases were five-to-four, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), and six-to-three,
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
214. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342. This case will not be discussed in detail in this section. Although it impacts
criminal justice agencies, it is not directly concerned with the definition of crimes, the rights of suspects and

defendants, or the processing of criminal cases.
215. Baldwin, 124 S. Ct. 1347.
216. See, e.g., Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633; Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686; Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711.
217. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633.
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ings.2" s Yet, the Court was very divided on the reasoning for why Hamdi' s detention
was illegal.
Hamdi was picked up on the Afghanistan battlefield for allegedly fighting with
the Taliban against the United States.2 9 The federal government classified Hamdi
as an "enemy combatant" and held him in a naval brig in Charleston, South
Carolina.2 2 Hamdi's father filed for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that his son's
Fifth Amendment right to due process had been violated because Hamdi had been
held without access to legal counsel and without being given a notice of the charges
against him. 221 Moreover, the petition asserted that Hamdi's arrest was not legally
authorized and that, because Hamdi was an American citizen held on U.S. soil, he
was entitled to the rights and protections of the U.S. Constitution.22 2
Justice O'Connor, announcing the judgment of the Court and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, found that the detention of U.S.
citizens-and Hamdi specifically-was legally authorized when Congress voted to
allow the President the ability to use military force in Afghanistan.22 3 As such, U.S.
citizens classified as "enemy combatants" generally can be detained during a time
of war. 22 4 However, these four justices also concluded that U.S. citizens facing the
possibility of indefinite detention, as was the case here because of the nebulous
nature of the war on terrorism, are entitled to a meaningful opportunity to challenge
the legal basis for their detention in a judicial proceeding.225 Justices Souter and
Ginsburg agreed with the plurality opinion that Hamdi deserved his day in court but
argued more generally that his detention was not legally sanctioned because
Congress did not explicitly authorize the detention of U.S. citizens.226
Justices Scalia and Stevens, in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia,
argued that the government must either give Hamdi a trial complete with constitutional safeguards or release him outright. 227 Congress may detain Hamdi if it
chooses to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, Justice Scalia said, but, absent such
a move, the state may not simply detain him.228 As Justice Scalia stated,
The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers

has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.
Blackstone stated this principle clearly: "Of great importance to the public is the
preservation of this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any,
the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers

218. Id.
219. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2637.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id. at 2636.
Id.
Id. at 2640-41.
Id. at 2640.
Id. at 2648.
Id. at 2653-56.
Id. at 2660-74.
Id. at 2671.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

thought proper.. .there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.

229

Justice Scalia continued,
The gist of the Due Process Clause, as understood at the founding and since, was
to force the Government to follow.. .procedures traditionally deemed necessary
before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. When a citizen was
deprived of liberty because of alleged criminal conduct, those procedures
typically required committal by a magistrate followed by indictment and trials....
To be sure, certain types of permissible non criminal detention-that is, those
not dependent upon the contention that the citizen had committed a criminal act
-did not require the protections of criminal procedure. However, these fell into
a limited number of well-recognized exceptions-[such as] civil commitment of
the mentally ill .... It is unthinkable that the Executive could render otherwise
criminal grounds for detention noncriminal merely by disclaiming an intent to
prosecute, or by asserting that
it was incapacitating dangerous offenders rather
than punishing wrongdoing. 2 0
Finally, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas found no fault with the detention, the possibility of indefinite detention, or the lack of any due process procedures.231 In short, Justice Thomas asserted that the President is vested with plenary
powers related to national security, including the power to designate enemy combatants and order their detention, and that the judiciary lacks the expertise and capacity to second-guess such executive decisions.232 While the remainingjustices failed
to agree on the exact scope and nature of the due process procedures the government must afford Hamdi, a clear majority was unwilling to accept this type of
executive action without any judicial oversight.2 33
The Court's other eight-to-one criminal justice decision, Baldwin v. Reese,3
clarified the use of federal habeas corpus relief by state prisoners.235 Writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer found that a state prisoner does not present a fair federal
habeas corpus claim if the court has to read beyond the petition to alert the federal
courts to the federal claim. 236 Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter to this conservative decision.237

229. Id. at 2662 (quoting 1 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIEsONTHELAWSOFENGLAND 131 (1765);
citing id. at 132-33).
230. 124 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 2674-85.
232. Id. at 2674.
233. Interestingly, following the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi, Hamdi was released and sent home to
Saudi Arabia without facing any criminal charges or further detention in his home country. Joel Brinkley, From
Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantanamo,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004. Hamdi merely agreed to renounce his
U.S. citizenship and promised to limit his future travel. Id. A spokesman for the U.S. military said, "Hamdi was
no longer considered a threat to the United States and did not possess any further intelligence value." Id.
234. 124 S. Ct. 1347 (2004).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1352.
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C. Seven-to-Two Decisions
There were four seven-to-two criminal justice decisions in the term and only one
of those ended in a liberal outcome.23 Starting with the lone liberal decision, the
Court issued unusually harsh statements regarding the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in a habeas corpus-based death penalty case. The case, Banks v.
Dretke,23 9 was one of two high profile, death penalty cases in Texas in which the
Fifth Circuit failed, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, to follow the high court's
precedents by refusing habeas relief.2' In this case, Delma Banks was convicted of
capital murder in 1980.241 During the original trial, the State failed to advise Banks
that the testimony of two of its witnesses could be easily challenged if not discredited.24 2 One witness was a paid police informant while the other had been
extensively coached.243 In addition, the prosecutor knowingly allowed its paid
informant to give false testimony and represented to the jury that the testimony was
not only truthful, but also of the "utmost significance." 2" The prosecutor also
allowed the second witness to tell the jury that his testimony was completely
unrehearsed. 245 The State's deception was eventually discovered in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. 246 Although the district court granted Banks relief, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that Banks had documented too late the
prosecutorial misconduct and, thus, federal relief was not available.247
In a strongly worded opinion by Justice Ginsburg, a seven-member majority ruled
for Banks, allowing him for the first time in twenty years to challenge his original
murder conviction. 248 As the Court noted, "When police or prosecutors conceal
significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the State's possession, it is
ordinarily incumbent on the State to set the record straight. 2 49 Chastising the court
of appeals, the Court wrote, "The Fifth Circuit stated its position on this point
somewhat obliquely, but appears to have viewed Rule 15(b) as inapplicable in
habeas proceedings. "250 The majority, however, stated that "[w]e have twice

238. Plilerv. Ford, 124 S. Ct. 2441 (2004); United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004); Thornton v. United
States, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).

239. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
240.
241.
242.

The second case is Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004). See Greenhouse, supra note 12.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1181-82.
Id. at 1264-65.

243. Id. at 1264.
244.

Id. at 1267.

245. Id. at 1263.
246. Id.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
See id. at 1271.
Id. at 1263.

250. Id. at 1279. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) states:
Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of

these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting

party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice the party in
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before referenced Rule 15(b)'s application in federal habeas proceedings." 25 ' Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, issued a dissenting opinion asserting that there
was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have altered its finding even
had the State disclosed the exculpatory evidence.25 2
In Thornton v. United States,253 the Court decided whether police officers can
search a car incident to a valid arrest if the officer first makes contact with the car's
occupant after the occupant has left the vehicle.254 In Thornton, which extended the
Court's ruling in New York v. Belton,255 Officer Nichols became suspicious of
Marcus Thornton's driving.256 Upon running Thornton's license plates, Nichols
discovered that the plate numbers did not correspond with the car Thornton was
driving.257 Before Nichols could stop Thornton, Thornton parked and exited the
car.25 Nichols proceeded to question Thornton, conducted a pat down, discovered
narcotics, and arrested him.259 Nichols, asserting that he was concerned for his
safety, then searched the car, uncovering a handgun. 2" Thornton sought to have the
gun suppressed as a product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment.26'
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority ruled against
Thornton and expanded principles articulated in Belton.262 In Belton, the Court had
ruled that, if a police officer has made a valid arrest of a car occupant, the officer
is constitutionally allowed to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle.263
The Court extended that ruling in Thornton by asserting that police officers can
search a vehicle without a warrant even if the driver has left the car.2 ' The Court
ruled that Thornton's arrest caused legitimate concern for the officer's safety as
well as concern for destruction of evidence inside the vehicle.2 65 Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Souter, dissented and stated that the majority had expanded the
doctrine articulated in Belton too far and that such a search is unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment. 2"
The third seven-to-two Supreme Court ruling dealt with the issue of double
jeopardy. In United States v. Lara,267 Billy Jo Lara, a Native American from a

maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance
to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
251. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1279.
252. Id. at 1281.
253.

124 S.Ct. 2127 (2004).

254. Id. at 2129.
255.

453 U.S. 454 (1981).

256. 124 S.Ct. at 2129.
257. Id.

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 2132.
263. 453 U.S. at 462-63.
264. 124 S. Ct. 2127.
265. d. at 2129.
266. Id. at 2139-40.
267. 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004). As noted previously, see supra note 31, some cases are difficult to classify as
"liberal" or "conservative." The Lara case fits the criteria as "liberal" because it is "pro-[Native American]," see
supra note 32 and accompanying text, in that it enhances the sovereignty of Native American tribes. However, the
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Chippewa tribe, ignored an order by the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe and attempted to
enter the Sioux Tribe reservation.2 68 Federal officers stopped Lara, and Lara
assaulted one of the officers. 269 Lara was then prosecuted by the Spirit LakeTribe
in tribal court for "violence to a policeman" and, upon being found guilty, served
ninety days in jail. 270 After Lara served his time, he was arrested by federal officials
for assaulting a federal officer.271 Because both crimes were based on essentially the
same key facts, Lara argued that the second prosecution by the federal government
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 72 The federal
government argued that, because the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe is a sovereign entity,
the second prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.273
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer agreed with the government's
perspective. 27 4 Because each prosecution was undertaken by a separate sovereign,
the Court found that the Fifth Amendment was not violated.2 75 Indeed, the Court
held that the double jeopardy protection did not apply because the prosecutions
were brought by dual sovereigns and thus were constitutionally permissible.276
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Thomas filed concurring opinions, while Justice
Souter,joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. 277 Justices Souter and Scalia argued that,
of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe, the tribe lacked the
because Lara was not a member
278
authority to prosecute him.
In Plilerv. Ford,279 the final seven-to-two case, the Court ruled that courts may

dismiss mixed habeas corpus petitions without warning petitioners that the petitions
will be dismissed.280 The majority opinion was written by Justice Thomas.28' Justice
Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Breyer.282 Justice
Breyer also dissented separately.28 3
D. Six-to-Three Decisions
Of the five criminal justice cases 2 4 decided six-to-three in the 2003-2004 Term,
three ended in liberal outcomes 285 and two can be classified as conservative

case is classified as "conservative" because the essential core of the liberal/conservative classification scheme
places greater emphasis on the issue of whether an individual's claim of right was supported or whether the court
sided with the government. See supra note 33.
268. 124 S. Ct. at 1631.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271.

Id.

272. Id.
273.
274.

Id. at 1631-32.
Id. at 1639.

275. Id.
276. Id. at 1634.
277.

Id. at 1639, 1641, 1648.

278. Id. at 1649.
279. 124 S. Ct. 2441 (2004).
280.
281.

Id. at 2444.
Id.

282. Id. at 2448-49.
283. Id. at 2449.
284. Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Tennard v. Dretke,
124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
285. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. 2562; Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739; Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
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rulings.2" 6 The three liberal decisions, in particular, are all very controversial. Rasul
v. Bush287 is one of three "war on terrorism" cases decided in the term.288 Tennard
v. Dretke2. 9 is the second of two cases in which the Court overruled a Texas due
process decision2" and criticized the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 9' Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain2 . in part opened the federal courts to lawsuits from individuals
claiming human rights abuse outside this nation's borders. 293 The conservative
decisions concerned a habeas petition2 94 and the Fourth Amendment. 95
The Court continued to be confronted with the task of balancing individual rights
with executive powers during the war on terrorism in Rasul v. Bush.296 The petitioners-two Australians and twelve Kuwaiti citizens297-were apprehended and
subsequently detained at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 298 Detained
since early 2002, the petitioners, through relatives, filed actions in the D.C. District
Court challenging the government's right to detain them. 299 The case concerned
claims of being denied counsel, being refused access to the courts, and not being
informed of the charges against them."° The petitioners contended that these actions
violated the U.S. Constitution, international law, and international treaties. 3"' The
Supreme Court considered a narrow question with potentially broad implications,
namely whether the U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges to the legality
of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad302 during hostilities and later
held in military custody at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base located in yet
another sovereign nation, Cuba.3" 3 The court of appeals affirmed a district court

286. Haley,.124 S. Ct. 1847; Lidster, 540 U.S. 419.

287. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
288. The others are Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004).

289. 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).
290. The other is Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
291. Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2569.

292. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). This is a six-to-three decision as to Part IV of the majority opinion, which
reserved the right for some foreign plaintiffs to sue U.S. citizens under U.S. law.
293. Greenhouse, supra note 12.
294. Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
295. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).

296. 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
297. Two British citizens-including the primary petitioner, Shafiq Rasul-were among the petitioners when
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 2690 n. 1. Both were later released from custody and dropped from the
case, resulting in fourteen remaining petitioners. Id. at 2691.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 2690-91.
300. Id.
301.

The two Australian citizens sought release, access to counsel, and other relief through separate habeas

corpus petitions. Id. at 2691. In their complaint, Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah and eleven other detainees
from Kuwait sought access to the courts or an impartial tribunal so as to be informed of the specific charges against
them and other relief. Id.
302. Applications filed on behalf of detainees maintained that the villagers, after being promised financial
rewards, captured the Kuwaiti citizens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Id. at 2691 n.4. The villagers turned over the
Kuwaiti citizens to U.S. custody. Id. A somewhat similar pattern is claimed regarding one of the Australians who
was transferred to U.S. custody after allegedly being captured by local groups opposing the Taliban. Id. It is

asserted that the remaining Australian was shifted from arresting Pakistani authorities to Egyptian and then U.S.
authorities. Id.
303. Id. at 2692-93.
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decision to dismiss the petitions for want of jurisdiction. 3" The Supreme Court
held, contrary to the position of the Bush administration, that U.S. courts do have
jurisdiction to review such matters, but the Supreme Court left unresolved many
issues regarding the extent of legal protections enjoyed by the detainees and how
these protections would be afforded.3 °5
The rationale for the rulings in the lower courts drew heavily from the Supreme
Court's decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,3°6 a case arising from military actions
in World War II and concerning a habeas corpus claim by civilians working for the
German military who were held in American custody abroad.3 7 The petitioners in
Eisentragerwere German citizens captured by U.S. forces in China, tried and
convicted of war crimes by an American military commission in Nanking, and then
incarcerated in occupied Germany.3"8 Noting the perceived similarities between the
claims by the detainees and those of the German prisoners in Eisentrager,the court
of appeals in Al Odah ruled that U.S. district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, stating that the Guantanamo detainees "are in all relevant respects in
the same position as the prisoners in Eisentrager."3° "They cannot seek release
based on violations of the Constitution or treaties or federal law; the courts are not
open to them."3 '
However, the Supreme Court's majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens
andjoined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, rejected the applicability of Eisentrager as a controlling precedent in the current case. 3 " This
majority, along with Justice Kennedy, who filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, found critical differences between the relevant conditions in Eisentragerand
those in Rasul. 3 2 Among these dissimilarities, the Court stressed that the
Guantanamo detainees are not nationals of countries at war with the United States
and that the petitioners deny that they have participated in acts of aggression against
the United States.313 Moreover, and again distinguished from the German petitioners
in Eisentrager,those detained at Guantanamo had not been charged formally with,
let alone convicted of, a crime and had never been given access to any tribunal in
which the validity of claims against them might be challenged.3 1 4 Importantly, these
petitioners had been imprisoned for over two years in a place-an American naval
base-where the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction (but not
ultimate sovereignty) through a century-old agreement between the United States
and Cuba.315

304. Id. at 2691-92.
305. Id. at 2694.
306. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The lower court decisions are Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145
(D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 1494 (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55
(D.N.Y. 2002).
307. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 765-66.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145.
311. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695.
312. Id. at 2693-94, 2700.
313. Id. at 2693.
314. Compareid. with Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 765-66.
315. The Court refers to the following agreements: Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23,
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Not only were the petitioners in the two cases differently situated according to
the Court, but the conditions critical in Eisentrager "were relevant only to the
question of the prisoners' constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus. ' ' 316 The
majority further reasoned that, because the habeas corpus statute (section 2241)317
would provide for federal court jurisdiction over the claims of an American citizen
held at Guantanamo, the statute does not distinguish between Americans and aliens
held in foreign custody, and, because the writ of habeas corpus acts upon the
custodian (for example, the Department of Defense) and not the prisoner,318 the
jurisdiction of a district court to hear such a claim is not strictly limited to only
those claims from petitioners detained inside the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.319 Thus, the Court concluded that section "2241 confers on the District Court
jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 320
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detentions in this case
involving the Guantanamo Base.32' However, Justice Kennedy did not believe that
the statutory predicate to Eisentrager'sruling in general has been as weakened as
much as other members of the majority had concluded; that is, Justice Kennedy
argued for the general preservation of the Eisentragerprecedent but viewed the
current case as sufficiently distinguishable.322 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia argued
corpus statute does not apply to aliens detained abroad by
strongly that the habeas
323
the U.S. military.
Despite the Court's apparently strong statement on the reach of the judiciary and
certain limitations on executive authority, many provocative issues remain
unresolved. The Court, for instance, did not explain what specific protections and
proceedings might be required regarding the Guantanamo detainees, and,
furthermore, it is unclear what aspects of the decision, if any, might apply in
situations in which foreign suspects are detained in parts of the world where the
United States does not have such a long-standing lease agreement or where it does
not exercise the extent of jurisdictional control that it does in Guantanamo.324
In Tennardv. Dretke,325 the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Circuit had failed
to follow the Court's precedents when it refused to issue a certificate of
appealability to Robert Tennard, even though his lawyers had argued that Tennard' s

1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. , T.S. No. 418 and the supplements; Lease of Certain Areas for Naval or Coaling Stations,
July 2, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, arts. I-I, T.S. No. 426; and Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.Cuba, art. mH,48 Stat. 1683.
316. 124 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777).
317. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
318. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,494-95 (1973) (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114
U.S. 564, 574 (1885)).
319. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2688.
320. Id. at 2698.
321. Id. at 2699.
322. Id. at 2700-01.
323. Id. at 2701-10.
324. Id. at 2702-03.
325. 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).
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low IQ prohibited his execution.326 In a scathing indictment of a decision by the
court of appeals to deny habeas relief, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stated,
"Despite paying lipservice to the principles guiding issuance of a COA [Certificate
of Appealability], the Fifth Circuit's analysis proceeded along a distinctly different
'
track."327
The Court went on to state that the Fifth Circuit's analysis had "no foundation in the decisions" of the high court.32 The Court asked whether Tennard's
limited capacities would have persuaded a reasonable jury to find his IQ to be a
mitigating factor when deciding whether or not to apply the death penalty. 329 Indeed,
the majority found that the case's facts had demonstrated that a jury might have
decided differently, and consequently reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling.330 Chief
331
Justice Rehquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas all wrote dissenting opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that a reasonable jury would not have placed
sufficient weight on Tennard's limited mental abilities to require reversal,3 32 while
Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed fundamentally with the precedent on which
the majority relied.333
Several cases in the 2003-2004 Term presented unique questions to the Court
regarding the jurisdiction of American courts to resolve disputes that did not take
place on American soil. In one such case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,334 the Court
interpreted the meaning of the two-centuries-old Alien Tort Statute. 335 This statute
allows foreigners who are victims of abuse abroad to use U.S. courts to sue for
human rights violations.336 In this case, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was captured, tortured, and murdered in Mexico in 1985. 3 " DEA
agents believed that Humberto Alvarez-Machain was involved in the murder.338
These agents eventually hired Jose Sosa and other Mexican nationals to abduct
Alvarez-Machain and to bring him to the United States where he was arrested by
federal agents. 339 Ultimately, Alvarez-Machain was acquitted on all charges and
filed a civil action against Sosa, other Mexican citizens, DEA operatives, and the
United States. 3' ° Alvarez-Machain sued the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and Sosa under the Alien Tort Statute."I A divided342Court held that
Alvarez-Machain was not entitled to recover under either claim.

326. Id. at 2570.
327. Id. at 2569 (citations omitted).
328. Id. at 2570.
329. Id. at 2569-70.
330. Id. at 2573.
331. Id. at 2573, 2575, 2576.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 2575-76.
334. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
335. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("Ihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
336. Id.
337. Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2746.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 2746-47.
341. Id. at 2747.
342. Id.
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Although the Court's ruling barred Alvarez-Machain from obtaining monetary
damages, the Court left open the possibility that other foreigners who claim to be
the victims of human rights violations could sue in U.S. courts even if the offenses
took place abroad. Given the chance that Americans, both civilian contractors and
government personnel, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
might have committed relevant violations against prisoners confined as a result of
military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the more general "war on terrorism," the
ruling in Sosa allows for the provocative possibility that such individuals might sue
their alleged abusers in U.S. courts. Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented from Part IV of Justice Souter's majority opinion.34 3
Turning to the six-to-three conservative decisions, the Court handed down an
important Fourth Amendment ruling in Illinois v. Lidster344 dealing with the
constitutionality of information stops."4 The case began in Illinois in 1997 when an
unknown motorist killed a bicyclist. 46 A week later, in an attempt to gain
information about the accident, the police set up an informational checkpoint. 347 At
checkpoints that were erected at the same location and time of day as the original
accident, vehicle occupants were stopped for approximately ten to fifteen seconds
each and questioned by police. 348 Robert Lidster approached a checkpoint, swerved,
and nearly hit an officer. 349 Lidster eventually failed a sobriety test and was
arrested.35" After his conviction for driving under the influence, Lidster challenged
his conviction, arguing that the information used to arrest him was gathered at a
checkpoint that violated the Fourth Amendment.35 '
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer first stated that this case was not
governed by the Court's decision in Indianapolisv. Edmond,3 52 in which the Court
held that general crime control checkpoints without individualized suspicion are
unconstitutional.35 3 Rather, the Court asserted that these checkpoints were not
intended to catch criminals but rather to gather information about a crime that in all
probability was committed by a person other than the driver stopped.35 4 As such,
Edmondwas not controlling. 35 5 The Court then asked if the information checkpoints
used here were reasonable and found that they did not violate the Fourth Amendment.356 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented in part, arguing that the
roadblock may not have been reasonable and should be investigated further by the
lower courts.357

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at 2769.
124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
Id. at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
531 U.S. 32(2000).
Id. at 48.
Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 889.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 891-92.
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A final six-to-three conservative ruling pertains to habeas corpus petitions.358
Generally, the federal courts do not entertain habeas corpus petitions based on
procedural defaults without a showing of prejudice.359 The exception to this rule is
when the petitioner can show that a constitutional error resulted in the conviction
of someone making a claim of actual innocence in a capital case. 360 The Court, in
Dretke v. Haley,36' had the opportunity to expand this exception to non-capital
cases. 362 However, the majority declined to do so in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, though the Supreme Court did remand the case for further consideration.363 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, dissented, arguing
forcefully that Haley should be granted habeas corpus relief and released
immediately. 3' As Justice Stevens noted, "The miscarriage of justice is manifest.... [T]he Court's ruling today needlessly postpones final adjudication of respondent's claim and perversely prolongs the very injustice that the cause and prejudice
standard was designed to prevent. '36 5
E. Five-to-FourDecisions
There were eleven 3 1 five-to-four criminal justice decisions handed down by the
Court in the 2003-2004 Term (five liberal367 and six conservative3 68 ) covering a
wide variety of issues, including questions regarding the First,3 69 Fourth, 370 Fifth, 37'
Sixth,372 and Eighth amendments,373 and the rights of detainees in the context of the

358. Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
359. Id. at 1849 ("Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration ofjustice, a federal court
will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of
cause and prejudice to excuse the default.").
360. Id. ("We have recognized a narrow exception to the general rule when the habeas applicant can
demonstrate that the alleged constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of
the underlying offense or, in the capital sentencing context, of the aggravating circumstances rendering the inmate
eligible for the death penalty. Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986); Sawyer
v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992).").
361. 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
362. Id. at 1849.
363. Id.
364. See id. at 1854-55.
365. Id. at 1855.
366. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004);
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004); Beard
v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004); Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004); Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct.
1978 (2004); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004); Missouri
v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
367. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531; Groh, 124 S. Ct. 1284; Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601;
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783.
368. Padilla,124 S. Ct. 2711; Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620; Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140; Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. 2451;
Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504; Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, will not be discussed in detail in the
following section. Although it can affect institutions in the justice system, the issue under the Americans with
Disabilities Act did not concern the definition of crimes, constitutional rights for suspects and defendants, or the
processing of criminal cases. See id.
369. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783.
370. Groh, 124 S. Ct. 1284; Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. 2451.
371. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620; Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140; Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601.
372. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531.
373. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504; Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519.
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war on terrorism. 3 74 Interestingly, one important analyst calls this the "Year
Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court. 3 75 Indeed, in five-to-four criminal justice
cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the Court's majority in the six cases that
ended in conservative outcomes and dissented in all five cases with a liberal outcome. The moderate conservatives appear to have moved the Court to the center in
certain cases, while Chief Justice Rehnquist's position over the years does not
appear to have changed.
InAshcroft v. ACLU,3 76 the Supreme Court ruled that the Child Online Protection
Act (COPA) was most likely a violation of the First Amendment.377 Congress
enacted COPA to protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit material on the
Internet. 378 The district court and appeals court prohibited enforcement of COPA
and the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, upheld the
injunction.3 79 Justice Kennedy, writing for Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, noted that the Court has consistently held that content-based prohibitions
on speech are presumed invalid and the burden of proof to show their constitutionality is on the government. 380 The majority found that the government had not met
that burden. 38' Further, the Court noted that there were many alternatives to censorship, including filtering, that are less restrictive and may even be more effective
than COPA.382 Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
took a more expansive perspective by asserting that criminal prosecution was an
inappropriate way to deal with offensive material.38 3 Justices Scalia and Breyer filed
dissenting opinions. 3 4 Justice Breyer's opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor.385
Justice Kennedy played a key role in two five-to-four Miranda cases, with one
case ending in a liberal outcome 386 and the other ending in a conservative outcome.387 In Missouri v. Seibert,388 Justice Kennedy was the swing vote whose
opinion concurring in the judgment helped the liberals reject a police tactic of
double questioning suspects, once without Miranda and then a second time with
389
Miranda.
The purpose of the method is to induce suspects to confess before they
are informed of their rights, and then to convince the suspects to repeat the confession after the Miranda warnings are given.39 While the first statements are
inadmissible, the question in Seibert was the admissibility of the second, post-
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Miranda statements.39 1 Justice Kennedy and the Court's four liberals found the
practice to be unconstitutional and both sets of statements to be inadmissible.39 2
In Seibert, the defendant's son, afflicted with cerebral palsy, died in his sleep.393
Seibert feared being accused of neglect 394 and devised a plan to burn her mobile
home to conceal the circumstances surrounding her son's death.395 Her plan also
included leaving a mentally ill teenager who had been living with the family in the
burning mobile home so that it would appear that her son had not been left alone.396
Seibert's other sons set the fire, and the mentally ill teenager died as had been
planned.39 7 Seibert was later questioned at the police station for about forty to fifty
minutes without the benefit of having been read her Mirandarights.398 After she
eventually made incriminating statements, she was given a twenty-minute break and
then Mirandized, after which she again made incriminating statements. 399 The trial
judge suppressed the pre-Mirandastatements but stated that the way in which the
post-Miranda statements were obtained did not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment. 4°
Writing for the plurality, Justice Souter found that the second set of statements
was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. °1 Justice Souter pointed out that
the practice of extracting information pre- and post-Mirandais not confined to the
Seibert case but rather is a two-stage interrogation process promoted by a national
police training organization (the Police Law Institute) and by other police departments.40 2 Given this organized effort to extract incriminating statements, the Court
concluded that the process could only be motivated by a desire to render the
Miranda warnings ineffective. 3 The plurality stated that the admissibility of
information obtained by the two-step process should depend on "whether Miranda
warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish their
object." 4" This test would apply to both intentional and unintentional interrogations. 4 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, felt that such a test should be
used only when the two-step process is used in a calculated manner to undermine
Miranda. °6 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas, dissented. 7
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In Grohv. Ramirez," 8 the Court addressed the validity of a warrant that failed to
adequately specify the things to be seized.' While the application for the warrant
contained a detailed list of items sought, that information was not included in the
actual warrant.4 10 Officers enforced the warrant at the home of Mr. and Mrs.
Ramirez, found no illegal material, and left a copy of the warrant, but not a copy of
the application, with one of the home's occupants.4 1' The officers were then sued
by the Ramirezes, leaving the high court to determine both if the warrant was valid
and if the officers could be sued.4 2
Writing for the majority of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, Justice Stevens found that the warrant was plainly invalid and that, although
the warrant was issued based on a properly constructed application, neither the
warrant nor the subsequent search was saved by the application.413 The Court then
turned to the question of whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity." 4
The majority opinion noted that immunity does not attach if "it would be clear to
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 415
Here, the Court found that, given that the warrant requirements are listed explicitly
in the Constitution, any reasonable officer should have been aware that the warrant
was invalid and, thus, the officers were not entitled to immunity.416 Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that, although the
Fourth Amendment was violated, the officers nevertheless should receive
immunity.4 7 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, went further than Justice Kennedy,
stating that the search itself was in fact reasonable.41 8
In a case with far-reaching implications, Blakely v. Washington,419 the Justices
in a five-to-four liberal decision cast doubt on the current use of sentencing guidelines. 42" Ralph Blakely, a Washington rancher, abducted his wife at knifepoint,
placed her in a wooden box, and drove to Montana with her.421 He also made their
thirteen-year-old child drive the family car behind them. 422 Blakely' s actions appear
to have been triggered by his wife's filing for divorce. 423 Blakely was caught, his
wife and child suffered minor physical injuries, and Blakely was charged with first-
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degree kidnapping. 424 Blakely agreed to a plea of second-degree kidnapping,
admitting the factual elements necessary for the second-degree charge, but not
admitting to facts that would have supported a higher charge.425 At sentencing, and
based on Washington's sentencing guidelines, the prosecutors recommended a
sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months.4 26 The judge, however, concluded that
Blakely acted with "deliberate cruelty," rejected the prosecutors' recommendations,
and imposed a sentence of ninety months.427 The ninety-month sentence was thirtyseven months greater than the statutory maximum, but the judge justified it based
on his determination of Blakely's deliberate cruelty toward his wife.4 28 Blakely
appealed, arguing that his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine all
the facts essential to his sentence, as mandated by the Sixth and Fourteenth
amendments, had been violated.429
Justice Scalia, writing for an unusual majority of Justices Stevens, Thomas,
Souter, and Ginsburg, found that the state violated the high court's ruling in
Apprendi v. New Jersey,430 in which the Court stated that "any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 43 ' Here, the judge could not have
justified the increased sentence without using facts that were not stipulated to in the
plea agreement, and, thus, without a jury's ruling, the judge's actions violated the
Sixth Amendment.4 32 Indeed, in a characteristically blunt manner, Justice Scalia
noted,
Petitioner was sentenced to prison for more than three years beyond what the law
allowed for the crime to which he confessed, on the basis of a disputed finding
that he had acted with "deliberate cruelty." The Framers would not have thought
it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his
liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its
accusation [to a jury]. 33
Justice O'Connor,joined by Justice Breyer in full and Justice Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist in part, dissented.434 Justices Kennedy and Breyer also wrote
separate dissenting opinions.4 35 Of these three dissents, Justice O'Connor's
expressed the greatest concern for the decision's implication for sentencing guidelines. Justice O'Connor noted that complications of the ruling would "either trim
or eliminate altogether... sentencing guidelines schemes and, with them, 20 years
of sentencing reform., 436 True to Justice O'Connor's prediction, the case
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'
immediately "left criminal sentencing in turmoil around the country"437
as there was
great uncertainty about what factors judges could rely upon in imposing sentences
under federal guidelines.4 38
Schriro v. Summerlin,439 a five-to-four conservative opinion, clarified the reach
of the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling in Ring v. Arizona. 40 In Ring, the Court decided
that juries, not judges, must determine the presence of aggravating factors that
would allow imposition of the death penalty in a capital case. 4 The question in
Summerlin was whether or not Ring "applies retroactively to cases already final on
direct review."" 2 Writing for the majority of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor, Justice Scalia found that Ring does not apply
retroactively." 3 The Court concluded that, when a person has had a full trial and
lost the subsequent appeals, "it does not follow that... he may nevertheless continue
to litigate his claims indefinitely in hopes that we will one day have a change of
heart." Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter, dissented
and called Ring a "watershed" decision that federal courts must apply when considering constitutional challenges to final death sentences.4'
The Court decided against retroactive application of another death penaltyrelated decision in Beard v. Banks.4 6 In Mills v. Maryland,44 7 the Court concluded
that capital sentencing schemes that require juries to ignore mitigating factors if all
the jury members do not unanimously agree on the validity of those mitigating
factors are unconstitutional. 448 The question in Banks was whether individuals
sentenced to death under invalid sentencing schemes before the Court's decision in
Mills was handed down should be provided relief under the Mills standard. 449 The
majority of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor, and
Kennedy, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, decided against the retroactive
application of Mills. 450 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter again
dissented.451
Extending the logic of Terry v. Ohio,4 52 the majority ruled in Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial District Court453 that people could be arrested for refusing to reveal their
identities to police during roadside questioning. 54 Larry Hiibel was arrested and
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convicted for refusing to identify himself during a Terry stop.4 55 The police had
approached Hiibel and asked for information about a fight that had recently taken
place.456 Hiibel appeared intoxicated and so the officer asked for identification.4 57
Hiibel refused and was arrested. 458 Although the Court recognized in Terry that
when police have a reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in a crime
they are allowed to stop the person briefly to investigate further, the Court had not
ruled on whether a person could be lawfully prosecuted for refusing to answer questions about his or her identity.459
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion upheld Hiibel's conviction by noting that
under ordinary circumstances a police officer is allowed to ask for identification
without violating the Fourth Amendment. 46° The Court also found no Fifth Amendment violation because merely disclosing one's name does not necessarily present
any reasonable degree of incrimination. 461 The majority opinion wasjoined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.462 In dissent, Justice
Stevens stated that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent does not allow the
police to force disclosure of one's identity.463 Moreover, Justice Stevens stated that
a person under suspicion of a crime should receive the same constitutional protections as one being investigated based on probable cause. 464 Also in dissent, Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, found that forced identification
violated the Fourth Amendment. 465 The case is considered a major defeat for
privacy advocates.'
Another case concerning Miranda rights in the 2003-2004 Term was
Yarborough v. Alvarado.467 The police wanted to speak to Michael Alvarado, who
was seventeen years old at the time of the crime, regarding a recent carjacking and
murder and left word with his parents requesting a meeting. 468 Alvarado's parents
brought him to the station and waited in the police station lobby for two hours as
Alvarado was questioned by police without the benefit of Miranda warnings.4 69
Alvarado eventually admitted his participation in the crime and was arrested.4 7 °
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Alvarado filed for habeas corpus relief, arguing that his Fifth Amendment rights had
been violated.47 '
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy ruled against Alvarado. 472 The Court
first noted that Alvarado was not in custody and thus was free to leave. 473 Because
he was free to leave, a Miranda warning was unnecessary and his rights were not
violated.474 Moreover, the Court noted that the state court's failure to consider
Alvarado's age did not warrant overturning his conviction.475 Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion left open the possibility that there might be situations in which
a person's age is a relevant factor in determining the constitutionality of police
actions.476 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Scalia
joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion.477 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented, asserting that Alvarado's Fifth Amendment rights were clearly violated because he was in custody and had not been
Mirandized.478 Moreover, Justice Breyer argued that Alvarado' s youth made it more
likely that he would have thought he was in custody and felt compelled to cooperate
with police, thus further mandating the use of Mirandawarnings by police.479
A final case in the 2003-2004 Term dealing with Miranda rights concerns the
ability of police to use physical evidence gathered as a result of voluntary statements made without the benefit of Miranda.In United States v. Patane,480 the Court
found that physical evidence resulting from voluntary, but unwarned, statements is
not "fruit of the poisonous tree" and thus is constitutionally admissible. 48' The
opinion was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia.482 Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred in the judgment that
the evidence could be used.483 Justice Souter dissented, arguing that the majority
opinion created an incentive for police to withhold Miranda warnings because the
physical evidence would nevertheless be admissible.48 4 Justice Souter' s dissent was
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens.485 Justice Breyer also dissented separately.486
The third terrorism case in the term, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,487 ended with a five-tofour decision in which the justices "punted" the case back down to the lower courts
on a jurisdictional issue.488 Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested at O'Hare
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Airport in Chicago because the government suspected that Padilla intended to
engage in terrorist activities in the United States.489 One month after his arrest,
Padilla was labeled an "enemy combatant" and transferred to military custody in
South Carolina without his lawyer being informed.49 Two days after the transfer,
Padilla' s lawyer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the New York federal
courts.

4 9 1

The Court avoided the habeas issue in the case by not rendering a decision on the
question of whether Padilla's military detention was constitutional. 492 That is, the
Court failed to address the constitutionality of the Executive's authority to detain
indefinitely, in military custody, an American citizen captured on American soil and
presumably protected by the U.S. Constitution.4 93 Instead, the five-member majority
of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas
concluded that Padilla's case was filed in the wrong jurisdiction and, therefore, the
case had to be refiled in the district court with jurisdiction over the location where
Padilla was being held after the transfer.494
It is possible that the justices remanded the case without decision because
otherwise a majority of the Justices, based on their votes in Hamdi, 95 might have
felt compelled to release Padilla outright. Hamdi was the eight-to-one decision in
which only Justice Thomas argued that the President has broad authority of the type
required to keep an American citizen in indefinite detention. 9 6 Thus, it appears that
the Justices felt unwilling to release Padilla in light of the government's frightening
but unsubstantiated claims about his planned terrorist acts 4 97 but also were unable
to endorse the government's practices of lengthy incommunicado detentions of
Americans.
Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, dissented,
arguing that the Court should address the merits of the case.498 Justice Stevens
concluded with a passionate argument about the importance to the concept of liberty
and freedom of court access for all detainees:
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even
more important than the method of selecting the people's rulers and their

successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the
rule of law. Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating
and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber. Access
to counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and
mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.
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Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers
to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons
from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be
justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure .... [I]f
this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not
wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.4 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's 2003-2004 Term will most likely be remembered for its decisions
regarding detainee rights and the extent to which the President can block constitutional rights and access to the courts during times of perceived national emergency.
The Court's obvious discomfort with the concept of indefinite detention and
unchecked executive power may shape the scope of the legal battles dealing with
the "war on terrorism" in future terms.
The term is also memorable for the relatively high number of liberal rulings
concerning criminal justice. Almost half of all criminal justice cases last Term
ended in liberal rulings, and a full fifty percent of the most hotly contested cases,
the five-to-four and six-to-three cases, ended in liberal rulings. Commentators
suggest that the Court's center, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, may have moved
farther away from the far right positions favored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas.5" The move of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy has led
to speculation that the 2003-2004 Term marks a decline of the Chief Justice's tight
control over the Court and his power on the Court. 1 Given the dynamic such a
change might signal for public policy and legal decisions, it will be interesting to
see if the question of whether the shift by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy is driven
by the particular nature of the cases in the term or a long-term change in judicial
philosophies is answered in the terms to come. If Justice O'Connor, in particular,
had any thoughts of retiring, her growing power as one of two members of the
Court's center, and a member who often casts a deciding vote in five-to-four cases,
may persuade her to pursue a longer Court tenure.
Finally, the Court's focus on certain types of issues was clear last Term. The
Court handed down a higher percentage of criminal justice decisions dealing with
constitutional issues, as opposed to statutory interpretation, than in past years. In so
doing, the Justices clarified important questions regarding the double-questioning
of suspects and Miranda rights, the ability of individuals to withhold their names
during Terry stops, and the retroactive application of death penalty rulings.
Although the terrorism cases certainly took center stage, the Court's other thirty
criminal justice cases, as well as the interesting potential shift of the Court to the
center on criminal justice issues, make the 2003-2004 Term of significant interest
to judicial scholars and other court watchers.
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